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Abstract 
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon, but relatively little is confidently known about its 
macroeconomic consequences. This paper explicitly models the transmission channels through which 
corruption indirectly affects growth. Results suggest that corruption hinders growth through its adverse 
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openness. Overall, a total negative effect of corruption on growth is estimated from these channels. 
These effects are found to be robust to modifications in model specification, sample coverage, and 
estimation techniques as well as tests for model exhaustiveness. Moreover, the results appear supportive 
of the notion that the negative effect of corruption on growth is diminished in economies with low 
governance levels or a high degree of regulation. No one-size-fits-all policy response appears supportable.  
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1. Introduction  
The significance of corruption lies in its ability to influence the very roots of an economy. 
Corruption erodes property rights and so prospectively has significant consequences for both 
efficiency and equity. It strains political institutions and thus also threatens democracy and the 
social, political, and economic benefits attributed to it. It is often undertaken in secret and 
consequently complicates the nature of economic exchange.  
The academic literature remains indefinite however about the impact of corruption on 
economic development.
1 Some early authors argued that corruption has the potential to improve 
efficiency and help growth. Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968), for example, viewed corruption 
as the necessary “grease” to lubricate the stiff wheels of rigid government administration. 
Similarly, other authors viewed corruption as working like piece-rate pay for bureaucrats, 
inducing a more efficient provision of government services. Lui (1985) demonstrates how bribes 
can minimize the costs associated with queuing and government labour, and consequently 
enhance the efficiency of public administration. Beck and Maher (1986) show a similar result 
when even under imperfect information the lowest cost firm is always the winner of a bidding 
procedure. More recently, Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) establish that in a situation where public 
officials are required to uphold property rights and enforce contractual arrangements, the costs 
associated with ensuring that public officials are not corrupt can be too high for the prevention 
of all corruption to be optimal.  
The arguments above in favour of the efficiency effects of corruption are heavily dependent 
on static and partial perspectives of the context in which corruption is taking place (Bardhan, 
1997; Kaufmann, 1997; Kaufmann and Wei, 1999; Seyf, 2001; Aidt, 2003).
2 For instance, Myrdal 
(1968) points out that instead of speeding up procedures, corrupt officials actually have an 
incentive to cause greater administrative delays in order to attract more bribes. Thus, “efficient 
corruption” arguments ignore the enormous degree of discretion that bureaucrats have. 3 
 
Bureaucrats are able (and willing) to create, proliferate and reinterpret regulations in order to 
extract the maximum amount of corruption available (Kaufmann, 1997: 115).
3 Recent literature 
therefore views corruption as much more than a price mechanism (see Jain, 2001). Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1991), for example, argue that corruption causes the reallocation of talent 
away from entrepreneurial activities towards unproductive rent-seeking activities, as the most 
talented people compete for the greatest payoffs available within the economy. Accordingly, the 
effects of corruption are multifaceted and not as straightforward as many of the early authors 
portrayed.   
Previous empirical research on corruption has commonly found that corruption impedes 
economic growth (Mauro, 1995, 1997, 1998; Tanzi, 1998; Kaufmann and Wei, 1999; Gupta et al., 
2000; Li et al., 2000; Gupta et al., 2001; Gupta et al., 2002; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004). Pellegrini 
and Gerlagh (2004: 429) note that ‘it is a common finding in the literature that corruption 
hinders economic growth.’ Svensson (2005: 39) adds that most, although not all, of the 
theoretical literature, as well as micro evidence, appear to suggest that corruption severely 
hampers development. At the firm level, Fisman and Svensson (2007) and Kimuyu (2007) both 
find corruption to have a negative effect on firm growth in Uganda and Kenya, respectively. 
Nonetheless, Svensson (2005) claims that there appears to be a mismatch between the micro and 
macro evidence, since within the cross-country setting corruption does not appear to affect 
growth. Svensson thus questions the validity of Mauro’s (1995) findings, which stand as the 
seminal evidence of a direct causal relationship between corruption and growth, and provides 
also some tenuous opposing empirical evidence. Svensson (2005: 39) concludes that an 
unanswered puzzle remains in the macro context.  
More recent empirical research largely supports Svensson’s claim. Rock and Bonnett (2004) 
check the robustness of the negative effect of corruption on growth and investment using four 
different corruption measures. They find that corruption slows growth and/or reduces 4 
 
investment in most developing countries but in large East Asian newly industrialised economies 
(China, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and Japan) corruption significantly promotes 
economic growth. On the other hand, Meon and Sekkat (2005) find a significant negative impact 
of corruption on growth. This impact is not only independent from corruption’s effect on 
investment but also tends to worsen as the quality of governance deteriorates. Such results not 
only contradict the “greasing-the-wheels” view but support the contrary hypothesis that 
corruption “sands-the-wheels”. These results, however, have been challenged by a recent study 
by Meon and Weill (2008). These authors analyse the interaction between aggregate efficiency, 
corruption, and different dimensions of governance and report a detrimental effect of corruption 
in economies with effective institutions but a positive association between corruption and 
efficiency in economies where institutions are ineffective. These results somewhat contradict 
Lambsdorff’s (2003) findings that support the notion that corruption lowers the productivity of 
capital. However, Lambsdorff also found that once bureaucratic quality was included into the 
regressions, the influence exerted by corruption became insignificant.   
Two further studies have sought to introduce nonlinearities into the corruption/growth 
relationship. Mendez and Sepulveda (2006) studied the effects of corruption on long-run growth 
by incorporating measures of political freedom as a key determinant of the relationship. They 
found evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and growth after 
controlling for several other economic variables. They show that corruption has a beneficial 
impact on long-run growth at low levels of incidence but is destructive at high levels, indicating 
that the growth-maximizing level of corruption is significantly greater than zero. This effect, 
however, was found to be robust only in a subsample of countries that have achieved a high 
degree of political freedom. Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008) undertake a similar excerise but instead 
of splitting their sample of countries according to some chosen level of governance quality, they 
allow the data to determine if two regimes exist. They find two goverance regimes. In the regime 5 
 
with high quailty institutions, corruption is found to have a significant negatve impact on growth, 
while in the low quality instutional regime no corruption effect on growth is observed. In sum, 
these emprical studies show that relatively little is confidently known about the macroeconomic 
effects of corruption.   
A second strand of economics literature has sought to determine the determinants of 
corruption (for example, Lederman et al., 2005). The most comprehensive econometric analysis 
of the sources of corruption is a cross-sectional study from Treisman (2000).
4 This study tested a 
wide range of theoretical explanations of corruption and finds mostly factors that are difficult to 
change in the short to medium run as determinants of corruption. Specifically, Treisman found 
countries with long exposure to democracy, Protestant traditions, histories of British rule, more 
developed economies, and higher import were less corrupt (althought the effect of imports was 
considerably small), while federal states were found to be more corrupt.   
In the main, subsequent empirical studies have focused on testing particular hypotheses by 
inserting a proxy for a specific variable into multiple regressions. Mostly, these studies have 
produced results that confirmed the theories that were tested. For example, several studies 
focused on the role of democracy (Chowdhury, 2004; Sung, 2004), others have investigated the 
role of decentralization and federalism (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Arikan, 2004), and one on 
whether natural resources prevalence was a source of corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999).  
Two recent reviews have sought to clarify which determinants of corruption are in fact 
robust. Treisman (2007) re-examines recent efforts to explain cross-country variation in 
corruption. Again he finds developed, long-estiablished democracies to be less corrupt. 
Countries with a free press, a high share of women in government, and a long record of trade 
openness are also found to be assocated with less corruption. On the other hand, countries are 
found to be more corrupt if they are dependent on fuel exports, intrusive regulations, and suffer 
from unpredictable inflation. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2008) undertake a similar exercise using 6 
 
newly available data that cover a large sample of countries. These authors also find richer 
countries with long exposure to democracy to be less corrupt. Moreover, protestant traditions, 
political instability, press freedom, and public sector wages are also found to be assoicated with 
corruption. Factors such as common law system, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation and 
decentralisation which were previously found to have a significant assocation with corruption are 
no longer found to do so. Accordingly, the literature contains a fairly stout list of variables that 
explain the variation in corruption levels.           
This paper addresses the nexus between corruption and growth, starting where Svensson 
(2005) finishes, with an aim of utilising the two current strands of the economic literature on 
corruption: namely, on the one side the effect of corruption on growth and on the other the 
determinants of corruption. The purpose of the paper is to model empirically the relationship 
between corruption and growth using cross-country panel data within a simultaneous equation 
system, and to thereby provide a complete and structured model of the various links between 
corruption and growth. This paper seeks to determine whether clear macro evidence of 
corruption’s impact on growth can now be provided through explicit consideration of the impact 
of corruption on these transmission channels, and in turn of their impact on growth. Although 
the notion of indirect and direct effects of corruption on growth is not unique (see Mo, 2001; 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004) our approach is distinctly different from previous studies. The 
methodology utilised allows us to decompose the total effect of corruption on growth into its 
different components. The system estimates the sign and magnitude of each channel while 
controlling for other competing channels, the determinants of each channel and the 
determinants of corruption. Attention is also focused on testing the robustness of the results. We 
find that corruption hinders growth by reducing investment in physical capital and human capital 
levels, and by increasing political instability. On the other hand, corruption is found to promote 
growth by reducing government size and, less robustly, by increasing trade volume. The 7 
 
cumulative result of these partial effects provides an overall moderate negative impact of 
corruption on growth.    
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the transmission channels. Section 3 
describes the specification of the empirical model and structure of the data set utilised in our 
study. Section 4 presents the empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes, and notes 
implications for policy. 
 
2. Transmission Channel Model    
In a cross-country setting Svensson (2005) asserts that the relationship between corruption 
and growth is inconclusive. Potentially, this uncertainty could be explained by the failure of past 
studies to accurately account for the multifaceted nature of corruption. In this regard, the 
empirical studies of Mo (2001) and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) are notable as both suggest that 
corruption has both direct and indirect effects on growth. We maintain a similar belief in the 
importance of transmission channels in demonstrating the significance and magnitude of the 
effect of corruption on growth. However, we employ a distinctly different empirical method and 
one that is more suitable for capturing the effect of these transmission channels. Before outlining 
this empirical method we must first clearly identify the potential transmission channels, as seen 
in the academic literature and elsewhere. The remainder of this section will outline these 
channels.  
2.1 Transmission Channel I: Physical Capital Investment   
Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence both suggest that corruption can influence 
economic growth through its impact on investment in physical capital (Romer, 1994; Mauro, 
1995; Ades and Di Tella, 1997; Mauro, 1997; Wei, 2000; Jain, 2001). These studies suggest that 
corruption affects investment by adding uncertainty to the returns on investment activities. First, 
additional costs must be incurred when corruption is present in the economy. Entrepreneurs are 8 
 
forced to relinquish to corrupt officials a portion of the proceeds from their investment in order 
to gain access to their target markets. Thus, corruption tends to act as a tax on ex-post profits, 
diminishing the incentive for individuals to invest. Secondly, uncertainty arises due to the 
illegality and secrecy associated with corruption. This necessitates efforts to avoid detection and 
punishment, causing ‘corruption to be more distortionary than [conventional] taxation’ (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993: 612). Moreover, as Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) point out, agreements 
made through the use of bribery or other types of corruption are not enforceable by the law. 
Resolution of any disputes may be costly. Hence, through these factors corruption adds 
uncertainty with respect to the returns on investment activities, ultimately reducing the incentive 
for private individuals to invest. One should note, however, that plausibly corruption could 
positively influence investment via “greasing-the-wheel” effects discussed above. Here, some 
ambiguity would exist with respect to the corruption-investment relationship in the context of 
high regulation (something we test for later). Furthermore, many studies have shown physical 
capital investment to be one of the most robust determinants of economic growth (for example, 
Levine and Renelt, 1992).  
2.2 Transmission Channel II: Human Capital  
Corruption distorts investment in human capital via four mechanisms. First, corruption 
weakens tax administration and can lead to tax evasion and improper tax exemptions, which 
lower tax revenue and diminish the resources available for funding public provision of services, 
including education and health (Mauro, 1997; Johnson et al., 1999; Gupta et al., 2002). Secondly, 
corruption adds to the operating cost of government, and therefore reduces the resources 
available for other uses, again including human capital formation. Thirdly, corruption affects the 
composition of government expenditure (Mauro, 1997, 1998). Corrupt officials are more likely to 
choose to undertake types of government expenditure that allow them to collect undetected 
bribes. Expenditure on education and health provide less opportunity for rent taking. Basic 9 
 
education requires only basic technologies that can be provided by a relatively large number of 
suppliers (Mauro, 1998: 264). This diminishes the opportunities for corruption since prices 
cannot easily be surreptitiously over-quoted. Mauro (1998) and Gupta et al. (2000) both show 
empirically that corruption adversely affects the provision of education and health services. 
Finally, corruption can decrease the share of recurrent expenditure devoted to operations and 
maintenance (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). Such expenditures do not provide much opportunity 
for extractable rents and can act as a barrier towards obtaining these rents. In extreme cases, the 
quality of an economy’s infrastructure may be intentionally reduced to the point where it needs 
to be totally rebuilt, thus again affording officials an opportunity to obtain rents through the 
tendering process. Moreover, in exchange for bribes, a corrupt system is more inclined to 
approve lower quality public procurement contracts (Mauro, 1997). This can lower the quality of 
education and health services and affects the ability of the state to improve educational 
attainment levels and overall health standards. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), amongst others, 
have shown human capital to impact positively on growth.
5  
2.3 Transmission Channel III: Government Size  
The potential impact of corruption on government size, as measured by the ratio of public 
consumption to GDP, is two-sided. On the one hand, corruption could encourage increased and 
inefficient allocation of government resources as corrupt officials seek to maximise their rent-
extracting potential (Montinola and Jackman, 2002: 150). In the context of public investment, 
some empirical evidence has been found to support the notion that corruption increases public 
investment (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Haque and Kneller, 2008), but these results are not 
conclusive (Mauro, 1997). On the other hand, corrupt officials could take an alternative route 
and maximise their rents by limiting the amount of public consumption expenditures. Either by 
underreporting public funds available for consumption or by redirecting public funds into 
private (often secretive, off-shore) bank accounts, corruption could potentially reduce 10 
 
government size. Elliot (1997) provides some preliminary evidence in support of this line of 
argument, in which she reports that the size of government budgets relative to GDP decreases 
with levels of corruption. Moreover, corruption has been found to reduce state revenue 
(Johnson et al., 1999). Hence, it is unclear whether corrupt regimes would spend more or less 
than transparent administrations, so the issue requires empirical examination.
6 Previously, 
empirical studies have documented a negative impact of a larger government on growth (for 
example, Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). These results have been theoretically 
explained by governments distorting savings (Barro, 1991), by bypassing the competitive process, 
or by the complete waste of government resources on unnecessary projects.   
2.4 Transmission Channel IV: Trade Openness  
The literature also suggests the potential for corruption to counteract movements towards 
greater trade openness. Krueger (1974) illustrates the rent-seeking activities created through 
quotas, clearly including corruption. Southgate et al. (2000) also contend that restrictions on 
trade, in the form of quotas or licenses, provide public officials substantial sources of rents.
7 
Since the movement towards free trade would remove the means to extract at least some bribes, 
corrupt officials consequently have incentives to impede such movements. It is reasonable to 
suppose that existing domestic firms possess the sort of local knowledge needed to keep bribe 
expenses to a minimum (Southgate et al., 2000: 2009). Potential foreign entrants lack this 
advantage and suffer disproportionately from corruption, which thereby acts as a brake on 
increased foreign investments. In contrast, the prevention of corruption could reduce trade 
volumes by increasing the international competitiveness of firms that engage in corruption. Beck, 
Mahler and Tschoegl (1991) found the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 enacted in the 
United States, which prohibited US firms from engaging in corruption, limited these firms’ 
ability to compete against firms from other countries who were able to engage in corruption. 
Similarly, Hines (1995) examined the impact of the 1977 legislation on US business activities 11 
 
with corruption-prone countries and found sharp decreases in US business activities. Such 
evidence supports the notion that corrupt firms are at some competitive advantage with respect 
to trade negotiations unless all countries play by the same rules. Thus, it is somewhat unclear 
whether corrupt economies will be more or less open to international trade, so the issue remains 
an open empirical question. In the main, as a result of increased market competition, 
technological transmissions, access to larger markets and other impacts, greater openness has 
been found to be associated with positive growth (for example, Wacziarg, 2001; Wacziarg and 
Welch, 2008). 
2.5 Transmission Channel V: Political Instability  
Corruption also challenges the popular legitimacy of political institutions and so can feed 
political instability and the violence that can flow from it (Mulloy, 1999 cited in Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh, 2004: 440). Corruption fuels perceptions of inequality and impropriety (Gupta et al., 
2002), and may encourage political instability through income polarisation (Mo, 2001: 74-75). 
Higher income inequality results in stronger incentives for the ‘have nots’ to engage in illegal or 
violent retaliation against ‘the haves’, especially if that wealth is thought to have been gained 
unfairly. Moreover, corruption attacks the foundations of democratic systems or what Friedman 
calls the social fabric, inexorably leading to political instability.
8 Empirically, instability is 
commonly found to reduce economic growth (for example, Barro, 1991; Alesina et al., 1996; 
Caselli et al., 1996; Easterly and Levine, 1997) 
 
3. Estimation Framework   
A model that links corruption to growth should ideally fulfil three criteria. First, it must have 
a theoretical foundation. Secondly, it must account for the various interactions between growth, 
the transmission channels, and corruption. Thus, it must identify and instrument for all 
endogenous variables in the model. Finally, the model should provide estimates of the magnitude 12 
 
by which corruption affects growth via the transmission channel, and the statistical significance 
of each channel. The empirical investigation undertaken in the rest of this paper seeks to satisfy 
these criteria through the use of the following econometric methodology. This method was first 
employed in a cross-country context by Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) to measure the effects of 
democracy on growth. It has subsequently been used by Wacziarg (2001) to investigate the 
impact of trade openness on growth, and by Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg  (2008) to 
examine the relationship between adult mortality and economic growth.
9 Here we apply this 
econometric methodology, which utilises three-stage least square estimation (3SLS), to 
investigate the relationship between corruption and economic growth.      
3.1 The Structural Model Specification  
The proposed econometric model consists of seven interrelated equations. It consist of an 
equation for growth of per capita income, one explaining the variation in corruption, and five 
channel equations, the latter capturing the influence of corruption on a set of growth 
determining variables. Following Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) we call this the structural model. 
Derived from economic theory, the structural model is set-up such that the channel variables are 
included in the growth regression, while the corruption index appears only in the channel 
equations. As such, it is intended that these channels exhaust the avenues by which corruption 
could influence growth (formal testing of the model’s exhaustiveness is undertaken in the 
following section). Furthermore, the corruption equation is added to the model to address 
endogeneity issues relating to the potential simultaneous determination of corruption, growth 
and the channel variables as suggested both by theory and by past studies. 
Formally, our model consists of m = 1, …, M  structural equations, with j = 1, ..., M 
endogenous variables and k = 1, …, K exogenous variables for t = 1, …,T time periods covering 
i = 1, …, N countries. The most general version of the structural model would consist of a set of 
(T × M) equations of the form:
10        13 
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In its current form, the model is too general for the parameters to be identified. Accordingly, 
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) impose the following restriction, which we too follow. First, all 
non-contemporary coefficients are restricted to zero ( 0
tm
sm γ = and 0
tm
sk δ = st ∀≠). Second, 
coefficients for each variable are constrained to be equal across time in each structural 
relationship (  
tm sm
tm tm γγ = and
tm sm
sk tk δδ = s ∀ ).11 Third, in each structural equation the coefficient on the 
endogenous variable designated as the dependent variable for that structural equation is set equal 
to one. With these restrictions, the structural model is greatly simplified. For each set of T 
equations, the m = 1, ..., M structural equation can be written as: 
  11 11
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where  ij y ,  ik x , and 
m
i ε  are (T × 1) vectors which stack the endogenous variables j = 1, ..., M, the 
exogenous variables k = 1, …, K and the errors m = 1, …, M over the T time periods. Hence, we 
can stack these equations over the M structural relationships:  
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The standard assumptions on the error vector also apply:  () i E = ε 0and () ii E ′ = εε Σ. Assuming 
that Γ is non-singular (the completeness condition) the reduced form of the model is: 
  () ii i = ⊗+ T y Π Ix v  (4) 14 
 
where 
-1 = Π -ΓΔ  and
1 () ii
− =⊗ T v Γ I ε . The error term assumptions imply the reduced form 
error vector has the following properties:  () i E = v 0 and  () ii E ′ = vv Ω   where
-1 -1 () () ′ =⊗ ⊗ TT ΩΓ I ΣΓ I . Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) remark that an important features of 
this model is that by allowing the reduced form error terms to co-vary across time for a single 
relationship the model is effectively permitting a country specific effect that is independent from 
the right-hand side variables, an approach equivalent to the random effects model. Note, 
however, that the assumption that  () ii E ′ = εε Σ  implies that heteroskedasticity and spatial 
autocorrelation are not permitted within the model given that the covariance matrix of the full 
error vector does not depend on the country i. 12 
3.2 Specification, Identification and Estimation 
To determine the specification of the system we follow two strategies developed by Tavares 
and Wacziarg (2001). The first strategy entails we specify a system based on a priori theoretical 
exclusions. This model is our benchmark model. In determining the benchmark specification we 
utilise the studies which were discussed in Section 2 as well as Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) and 
Wacziarg (2001). The specifications of the later two studies are themselves based upon existing 
empirical work, which we also referred to in the specification of our model (for example, Barro, 
1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Easterly and 
Levine, 2001; Durlauf et al., 2005). Furthermore, in specifying the corruption equation we utilised 
prominent past studies which were outlined in Section 1 (for example, Treisman, 2000, 2007). 
The estimation of seven equations implies the need for a relatively wide set of exogenous 
variables. We selected a total of 20 exogenous variables with the aim of selecting a sufficiently 
wide set of variables to limit the scope for omitted variable bias. Accordingly, we selected a range 
of demographic, historical, cultural, geographic, and political variables. The full specification of 
the benchmark theoretical model is outlined in Table 1. 
[Table 1] 15 
 
Referring to Table 1, interest rests in three sets of estimates. Firstly, in the channel equations 
– equations (2) to (6) – we are interested in the estimated coefficient of corruption on the 
channel ( 7
m γ for m = 2, ..., 6). These represent the direct effect of corruption on the channel 
variables. Secondly, in the growth equation, we are interested in the estimated coefficients on the 
channels variables (
1
j γ for j = 2, ..., 6). Following from this, the product of the coefficient on 
corruption in the channel equation and the coefficient of the channel variable in the growth 




j γ mj ∀=). The summation of these products then gives an indication of 
the combined effect of corruption on growth, accounting for any potential bi-directional 
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Thirdly, the inclusion of growth (
7




5 γ ) in the 
specification of the corruption equation gives rise to feedback within the system. Specifically, an 
initial change in corruption will cause changes in the channel variables and growth which 
feedback into the corruption equation, causing further change in corruption. Potentially this 
feedback could continue infinitely. Consequently, the calculation of the total effect of corruption 
on growth is more complicated compared to Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) system.
13  
To express the total effect in a formal manner we designate
7
q y Δ to be the change in 
corruption in round q.
14 Next, we allow each of the channel variables in the model to be denoted 
g = 2, ..., 6. Hence, we let 
g





qq y γ y Δ =Δ                (6) 
Next, we define 
1










Δ =Δ ∑  (7) 16 
 
Note that Equation (7) collapses to Equation (5) when 
7
q y Δ  equals one. Finally, we can express 
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= Δ ∑  (9) 
The total effect will only converge if the feedback into corruption (
7
q y Δ ) gradually declines. For 
operational purposes we use the convergence criterion to terminate computation at some Q 
where at Q the
7
Q y Δ < 1×10
-15. At this Q the feedback into the system is terminated and the total 
effect estimated. As demonstrated in Figure 1 we achieve convergence quite rapidly and usually 
within 10 to 20 iterations. 
[Figure 1] 
The benchmark model is estimated jointly using three-stage least squares. The 3SLS 
methodology implies that the exogenous variables in the system that are excluded from a given 
equation are used as instruments for the included endogenous variable(s) in that equation. In our 
model, the exclusion of leads and lags of exogenous variables ensures that the number of 
excluded instruments exceeds the number of included endogenous regressors, even when all 
contemporary exogenous and endogenous regressors are included in every channel equation.
15 
Hence the system is identified by construction. Such instrumenting ensures the coefficient 
estimates are consistent. Moreover, 3SLS allows us to take account of the error correlations 
between equations, resulting in gains in efficiency. Furthermore, this method permits the 
computation of a single covariance matrix for all the estimates in the system. This allows 
inference on functions of parameters that may not necessarily belong to the same equation. For 
example, this allows us to make inferences on the combined effect of corruption on growth as 
defined in Equation (5).
16 Hence, by estimating our model using 3SLS we are able to combine 17 
 
features of instrumental variables, generalized least squares, and random effect models, whereby 
consistency is achieved through instrumentation, and efficiency is gained through appropriate 
weighting (Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001: 1351).
17  
   The second strategy employed to specify the model involved an empirical specification search. 
Bias could be introduced into our estimates if the benchmark model excludes a relevant 
endogenous or exogenous variable from any one of our structural equations. Hence, to control 
for this possibility, the data is allowed to determine which variables should appear in each 
equation through an iteration process. At the first stage, the full system, which includes all 
contemporaneous variables on the right-hand side, was estimated using 3SLS. Naturally, this 
system will be over-specified and the number of exclusion restrictions is limited as a result. 
Accordingly, much is to be gained by reducing the system. The criteria for excluding variables 
from the various equations are twofold. First, we exclude variables that are statistically 
insignificant from zero. Second, we test the validity of these exclusions as a whole by computing 
a quasi-likelihood ratio (QLR) joint test based upon the minimum distance criterion from the 
reduced and initial models.
18 The exclusion of insignificant variables will modify the pattern of 
significance for the remaining coefficients. Consequently, we utilise the above criteria on 
subsequent iterations until we arrive at a specification whereby the included variables are chosen 
basis upon their individual statistical significance.    
The empirical framework bears some similarity to that of Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), but 
nonetheless deviates from their structure in several ways. First, an extra transmission channel is 
added: government size. Secondly, each transmission channel includes a set of controls. 
Although Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) do include some control variables in their study, they do 
so only as a robustness test and the variables do not vary between channels nor include any cross 
dependence between the various channels. Thirdly, corruption is explained by political factors 
and environmental variables drawn from the theoretical and empirical work of previous authors. 18 
 
Finally, the presence of endogenous variables in the channel equations implies that indirect 
channels effects can be controlled (for example, corruption could influence political instability, 
which affects government size, which in turn affects growth). Therefore, the model attempts to 
encompass as completely as possible the full relationship between corruption and growth.  
3.3 Description of the Data  
As previously outlined the chosen estimation methodology requires a relatively large set of 
variables.
19 Consequently, after eliminating countries with inadequate data coverage, this study 
covered a cross-section of 81 countries for the time period 1984-2005. This allowed a 
significantly wider coverage than was possible in the earlier studies of Mauro (58 countries) and 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (48 countries).The data was constructed into a panel, split into two five-
year periods (1984-1988 and 1989-1993) and two six-year periods (1994-1999 and 2000-2005).
20 
As most of the variables entered in as five-year or six-year averages it is anticipated that the 
potential for measurement error and business cycle fluctuations influencing the results is 
minimised.  
The main data on corruption were taken from the Researcher’s Dataset constructed by Political 
Risk Services (ICRG, 2006). The degree of corruption is measured by an index constructed by 
the PRS group, published as part of their International Country Risk Guide. The ICRG corruption 
index varies from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating higher corruption.
21 The definition provided 
by the PRS (2006, p. 31) indicates that this corruption index intends to measure corruption in the 
political system and is ‘concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favour-for-favours”, secret party funding, and 
suspiciously close ties between politics and business.’ The reasoning for this particular choice is 
three-fold. First, this index provides a measure of corruption over a substantial period of time. 
Due to data limitations, some of the earlier studies on corruption were forced to use measures of 
corruption that covered only a fraction of the time period under consideration. In this study the 19 
 
time period has been limited only to the period for which data on corruption is available. 
Second, the ICRG index appears to measure multiple dimensions of corruption, which is 
important given the difficulty of defining corruption. Third, although based on perceptions, in 
the context of corruption such measures are appropriate. Others to have used this data as a 
proxy for corruption include Knack and Keefer (1995); Tanzi and Davoodi (1997); Wei (2000); 
and Mendez and Speulveda (2006). We also test the sensitivity of our choice of corruption 
measure by re-estimating our model using the World Bank’s Control of Corruption (COC) 
index.
22  
Table 2 presents the correlations between the main variables of interest. The correlations are 
all consistent with previous studies. Investment, human capital and openness all are found to 
have a positive correlation with growth. Furthermore, corruption, political instability, and 
government size (albeit minuscule) are all negatively correlated with per capita income growth. 
The third column details the correlation between corruption and the channel variables. All are 
found to be negatively correlated with corruption with the exception of political instability. The 
high correlations between corruption and the channel variables give some support to both the 
choice of channels and the simultaneous equation methodology undertaken in this study. If these 
correlations carry through to the model estimates they imply that corruption negatively affects 
growth through lower levels of investment, human capital, and openness and higher levels of 
political instability, while concurrently, positively affecting growth by reducing government size.
23 
As will we find, this picture is not completely sustained once we have controlled for the 
interactions between these variables, other control variables, and potential endogeneity bias.        
[Table 2] 20 
 
4. Empirical Results   
4.1 Benchmark Results  
A summary of the effects of corruption on growth through the transmission channels for the 
full sample of 81 countries over the period 1984-2005 are presented in Table 3.
24 The second 
column of Table 3 presents the coefficients on corruption from the five channel equations. We 
find that corruption has significant negative impacts on investments in physical capital, human 
capital, and government consumption. Concurrently, corruption is found to have significant 
positive influences on political instability and trade volume. All of these coefficients are found to 
be significant at the 1 percent level. These results are broadly consistent with Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2004) and Mo (2001). The one exception is the positive influence of corruption on 
trade openness. This result could be explained by the differences in country and time coverage of 
our study (81 countries for the period 1984-2005) and that of Pellegrini and Gerlagh (48 
countries for the period 1975-1996, although corruption is measured only for the period 1980-
1985). However, one should note that our sensitivity analysis finds the openness channel to be 
the least robust of the channels, fluctuating in terms of statistical significance and changing sign 
on occasion.  
[Table 3] 
The third column of Table 3 details the estimated effect of different channels on growth. All 
of the channels enter with their expected sign and are consistent with the broad findings of past 
cross-country growth studies (for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 
1997) and the transmission channel model of Tavares and Wacziarg (2001). The estimates 
suggest that higher levels of growth are achieved through increases in physical capital investment, 
human capital levels and trade openness, as well as decreases in political instability and 
government consumption. Investment in physical capital, human capital attainment, and political 
instability are found to be significant determinants of growth at a 99 percent confidence level, 21 
 
while government consumption is significant at a 97 percent confidence level and openness only 
at a 94 percent level.    
The effects of corruption on growth through each of the channels are revealed in the last 
column of Table 3. These results suggest that corruption has detrimental effects on growth 
through physical capital investment, human capital, and political instability. At the same time, 
corruption is found to foster growth by increasing trade volumes and decreasing government 
consumption. These combined effects are all significant at a 99 percent confidence level, with 
the exceptions of government consumption (97 percent) and openness (92 percent). The largest 
effects are through investment (which is consistent with Pellegrini and Gerlagh) and political 
instability (which is consistent with Mo) channels. The combined effect of corruption on growth 
is found to be negative and statistically significance from zero at a 99 percent confidence level.
25 
This combined effect indicates that an initial one standard deviation (1.382) increase in the 
corruption index brings about an approximate decrease of annual growth in GDP per capita of 
0.39996 percentage points.
26 After accounting for the feedback effects, we find that the model 
converges to a total effect of -0.3409, implying that a one standard deviation increase in the 
corruption index leads to a 0.4711 percentage point decrease in economic growth. This result is 
smaller than Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004: 434) benchmark result: they find a decrease in the 
corruption level of one standard deviation increases economic growth by approximately 1.05 
percentage points per year. This is unsurprising since Pellegrini and Gerlagh do not find any 
positive effects of corruption on growth via the transmission channels they estimated. Overall, 
the total effect of corruption on growth is negative and economically moderate. The origins of 
this effect are empirical explained by the varying effects of the respective transmission channels.        
4.2 Robustness Testing  
In this section we test the robustness of our benchmark model to changes in the model 
specification, sample coverage, and estimation method. Moreover, we test for whether our 22 
 
model exhaustively captures the total effect of corruption on economic growth. To conserve 
space we report only the combined effects of corruption on the channels and the total effect 
under the different models. These results are then compared to the benchmark model (which is 
included in all the tables).      
4.2.1 Model Specification and Alterations   
Plainly, our estimates of the total effect of corruption on growth could be influenced by the 
degree of feedback specified in the model. In the benchmark model feedback is permitted via the 
inclusion of growth, openness, and political instability in the corruption equation. Table 4 
presents several modifications to the degree of feedback permitted in the model. Firstly, we 
estimate the model with no feedback: that is, we drop growth, openness, and political instability 
as determinants of corruption. This is case the combined effect is the total effect. Even with no 
feedback, the total effect is still found to be negative and only slightly smaller than the base 
model result. Next we include growth in the corruption equation as the only source of feedback, 
a specification identical to Wacziarg (2001). Here we find the feedback to be small, with 
convergence achieved after only 8 iterations. Following this, we include all the channel variables 
in the corruption equation. Unsurprisingly, the total effect is greater than estimated in the base 
model. Finally, we estimate the model permitting feedback via the corruption equation and each 
of the channel equations by including economic growth in all the channels and all the 
endogenous variables in the corruption equation. Convergence is again achieved and the total 
effect of corruption of growth is still found to be negative and economically moderate. Thus our 
base model does seem to be robust to the degree of feedback permitted. Figure 1 illustrates that 
the base model estimate is roughly midway between models that permit no feedback and those 
that permit numerous avenues. If anything, the total effect of corruption on growth estimated 
using the base model is rather a conservative estimate, reinforcing our confidence in the 
benchmark specification.      23 
 
[Table 4] 
Table 5 presents the results from the empirical specification search outlined in Section 3.2. 
We present the estimates at each stage. At all iterations the signs of all the channels are 
consistent with the benchmark model. The total effect is reduced slightly compared to the 
benchmark model but remains statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level once we 
arrive at the last iteration. The QLR statistics illustrate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the excluded variables are jointly insignificant indicating that the exclusions of the variables 
are statistically justifiable at each stage. Notably, a majority of the determinants in the benchmark 
model survive the specification search. Approximately 73.25 percent of the variables appearing in 
the benchmark model also appear as significant determinants in the systematic search 
specification. Focusing on the last column of Table 5 we find that the significance of all the 
channels has been reduced slightly, with the exception of openness which has become more 
significant. Investment continues to be the dominant channel. On the whole, the benchmark 
specification appears robust to the empirical specification search. Corruption maintains its effect 
on the channels and all the channels maintain their effects on growth. Accordingly, the total 
effect continues to indicate a negative effect of corruption on growth.  
[Table 5] 
Table 6 presents the results of several modifications to the benchmark model. First, we allow 
the intercepts of each relationship to vary across time. The channels are robust to this 
specification change with the exception of trade openness. While the sign on openness is 
maintained, the effect is no longer significant even at a 90 percent level. This is a consequence of 
both the effect of corruption on openness and the effect of openness on growth decreasing in 
significance. The magnitude of the effect of investment, human capital and political instability all 
increase in comparison to the benchmark leading to an increase in the negative total effect, 
which has also increased in statistical significance.  24 
 
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001: 1361) indicate that the results may be influenced by the effect of 
time-invariant region-specific effects not accounted for within the estimation method. 
Consequently, regional dummies for OECD member-countries, Latin America, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and East Asia, are added to the specification in the fourth, fifth and sixth columns of 
Table 6 to attempt to control for these effects. We begin by adding these regional dummies into 
the channel equations only. All of the signs of the channels are preserved and the magnitudes of 
the effects are diminished.
27 The statistical significance of the trade openness channel is again 
reduced and is no longer significant. Moreover, the government size channel is now marginally 
insignificant at a 90 percent confidence level.  Next we added the region dummies to the 
corruption equation as well. Similar results are again obtained. Notably, government size and 
trade openness are again found to be insignificant. Finally, we also add the regional dummies to 
the growth equation. Very similar results are again obtained. The most notable difference is a 
change in sign of the government size channel; however, this channel is highly insignificant. 
The log of initial per capita income is included as a control variable for every equation. Given 
the moderate correlation between corruption and income levels (-0.665), we exclude the income 
variable from each of the channel equations to determine any sensitivity. We can expect the 
exclusion of income to lead to an increase in the overall effect of corruption on growth as 
corruption stands to capture some of the effect previously attributed to income. This is indeed 
the case, with the total effect almost doubling in magnitude. The signs of all the channels are 
preserved. Openness and government consumption are found to be insignificant as a result of 
reductions in significance of these variables in the growth regression.  
To control for possible endogeneity between growth and corruption, the benchmark model 
includes growth as a control variable in the corruption equation. This effect is found to be 
negative, as expected, and significant.
28 As past studies have rightly highlighted, this indicates that 
endogeneity does indeed need to be control for in the context of corruption-growth, reinforcing 25 
 
the desirability of the methodology we have utilised in this study. One may wonder whether 
similar endogeneity issues should be accounted for between the channel variables and growth. 
Consequently, we test for potential bias in our benchmark model by adding growth as a control 
variable into all of our channel equations. The final column of Table 6 presents the results of 
modification. We find that our benchmark model is robust to the inclusion of growth in all the 
channel equations. The signs of all the channels are preserved. The only major change is that 
human capital channel all but disappears, casting some doubt on its robustness. The total effect 
is slightly reduced, but remains highly significant.  
[Table 6] 
In a similar vein, one may question the possible endogeneity between corruption and the 
channel equations. In specifying the corruption equation in the benchmark model we followed 
past studies which have found openness and political instability to be determinants of 
corruption. It is possible that investment, human capital, and/or government size may also share 
a bi-directional relationship with corruption. We test the sensitivity of our model to this 
possibility by including all channel variables as determinants of the corruption equation. The 
fifth column of Table 4 presents the results of this modification. The benchmark model is found 
to be robust to this change. All the channels maintain their expected signs and all are statistically 
significant. The combined effect is very similar to the benchmark model and preserves its high 
statistical significance. Given the increased degree of feedback in the model, it is unsurprising 
that the total effect has increased. Such estimates reinforce our confidence in the benchmark 
results.   
We also tested the robustness of our base results to the estimation method by re-estimating 
the model using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). By doing so, we are running the model 
without instrumenting for the endogenous variables. Given the evidence we have found of bi-
directional relationships between corruption and growth, the use of SUR should lead to 26 
 
inconsistent estimates. Nonetheless, we present the results in column 3 of Table 7. The signs on 
all the channels are preserved. Moreover, the total effect continues to be negative, albeit 
considerably reduced in magnitude and no longer statistically significant. Such results again 
highlight the importance of accounting for endogeneity in the relationship between corruption 
and growth. 
[Table 7] 
The final alteration made to the model is to replace the ICRG corruption index with the 
World Bank’s Control of Corruption (COC) Index. The latter index is available only for the 
period 1996-2005 and thus forces us to lose two time periods. Consequently, we expect this loss 
in data will lead to higher standard errors and lower significance of the coefficients. The results 
from the COC index measure are detailed in fourth, fifth, and sixth columns of Table 7. In most 
case the signs of the channel effects are maintained. The most notable change is the reverse of 
the openness channel, which is uniform across all three specifications using the COC measure. 
This again highlights the low robustness of the openness channel, which frequently changes 
magnitude, significance, and now in sign. The magnitude of the combined effect increases, with a 
one-standard deviation change in the COC index (1.101) associated with 0.58 percentage point 
decrease in growth. However, the precision of this combined effect has fallen. The total effect 
corruption on growth also increases to approximately 0.6 percentage points. In the main, the 
results seem relatively robust to this alternative measure, especially given that half of the data is 
lost when using this measure.                                                      
4.2.2 Sample Coverage: Geography, Governance, and Regulation   
In this subsection we test the robustness of the benchmark results to the sample under 
consideration. We split the sample data based upon three factors: geography, governance levels, 
and degree of regulation. The factors were chosen to address recent empirical results that show 
no or positive relationships between corruption and growth in economies with low governance 27 
 
levels or a high degree of regulation (Aidt et al., 2008; Méon and Weill, 2008). The results of 
these changes in sample coverage are reported in Tables 8, 9, and 10. With the loss of countries, 
the number of degrees of freedom will be reduced, and consequently, larger standard errors and 
lower significance of the coefficients is expected.   
Firstly, we re-estimate the benchmark model for sub-samples of OCED, Latin American, 
Sub-Saharan African, and East Asian countries. Most channels are robust to the splitting of the 
sample. Investment is affected most by the exclusion of OECD countries, changing in sign and 
becoming insignificant. The sign on human capital is preserved in all cases but insignificant when 
OECD and Latin American countries are excluded. The political instability channel is the most 
robust over the different restrictions. It maintains its sign and significance in all regions. The sign 
on government size is preserved but becomes insignificant when Sub-Saharan countries are 
excluded. The openness channel changes in sign twice over the different regions and is 
insignificant in all the different specifications, again indicating this channel is the least robust. 
Overall, the negative total effect of corruption on growth is maintained in all the sub-samples. 
However, this effect is insignificant when OECD countries are excluded. As OECD countries 
would generally have high levels of governance, this result seems supportive of Aidt et al. (2008) 
finding that corruption has no impact on growth in economies with low quality instiutions.  
[Table 8, 9, and 10] 
We look at the issue further by explicitly excluding economies based upon rating of levels of 
goverance. We ultise two sources of ratings: ICRG ratings on democratic accountability and law 
and order; and the World Banks’s Goverance Matters rating on government effectiveness, rule of 
law, absence of violence, and voice and accountability.
29 In order to strike an appropriate balance 
between excluding high governance countries and the loss of degrees of freedom, we use each 
rating to exclude the countries that are gauged in the top 25 percent of governance quality.
30 The 
results are reported in Table 9. When excluding the top quartile of sampled countries based upon 28 
 
all but one of the governance measures (absence of violence) the combined effect of corruption 
on growth remain negative and statistically significant at a 90 percent confidence level. Most 
notably, the total effect has reduced in absolute magnitude, driven mostly by a reduction in the 
investment channel. The negative total effect is thus maintained primarily through the political 
instability channel, which is significant across excluded specifications. Such results are intuitively 
appealing: corruption may “grease-the-wheel” and allow investments to increase, yet that effect is 
only partial. The negative influence of corruption on growth via political instability maintains its 
overall negative influence.   
The positive influence of corruption on growth via a “grease-the-wheel” effect may be most 
pronounced in economies burdened by a high degree of regulation. Consequently, we repeat the 
country-exclusion exercise based upon measures of regulation. We use each rating to exclude the 
countries that are gauged in the bottom 25 percent of regulation levels.
31 The results are reported 
in Table 10. Again the results show a marked decrease in the total effect of corruption on 
growth. However, the total effect remains negative. The combined effect is statistically 
significant at a 90 percent confidence level using two of the measures and marginally 
insignificant using the other two measures to split the sample. Again the significant negative 
influence of corruption via the political instability channel is maintained. Our results, therefore, 
appear consistent with the broad theme of Aidt et al. (2008): namely, the negative effect of 
corruption on growth is dampened in economies with low governance levels. However, the idea 
that corruption could be beneficial in economies with low quality institutions appears 
unsupported, with the negative effect of corruption on growth via the political instability channel 
robust even in these economies.  
4.3 Extensions and Exhaustiveness of the model    
In this final subsection we test whether the benchmark model fully captures the total effect of 
corruption on economic growth. The omisson of one or more channels could bias the total 29 
 
effect of corruption and/or influence the relative contributions of the various channels. 
Consquently, two methods are employed to test the exhaustivness of the benckmark model. 
Frist, we consider an additional channel and examine its impact on the model. Second, we 
undertake a test involving the residual of the growth equations. 
A possible channel omitted from our model is capital inflows. Corruption may undermine a 
country's ability to attract foreign capital. In a study of the capital flows from fourteen source 
countries to 45 host countries, Wei (2000)found that a rise in corruption levels in a host country 
reduces inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Such a result is consistent with the negative 
correlation (-0.07) between corruption and FDI in our sample period.  
Accordingly, we examine whether FDI could constitute another channel linking corruption to 
growth. The determinants of FDI include the log of intital income, log inflation, terms of trade 
shocks, distance to major commerical areas, log population, population density and several 
measures of the social envriornment – ethnolingustic fractionalization, protestant population, 
index of democracy and war count. We present the results of adding this channel to the 
benchmark model. We also re-run the systematic specification search as well as several of the 
sensivity tests we employed eariler. The estimates are displayed in Tables 11 and 12.    
[Table 11 and 12] 
  The results indicate that FDI does not appear to be a significant channel linking corruption 
to growth. The channel is never statistically different from zero even at a 90 percent level of 
confidence. In some cases this is due to a weak effect of FDI on growth and in other cases 
because of a weak effect of corruption on FDI. Most importantly, the inclusion of the FDI 
channel does not appear to effect the estimates of the other channels. The four robust channels 
– investment, human capital, political instability, and government size – maintain their formerly 
estimated signs and significance, while opennness continues to fluctuate in magnitude and 30 
 
statistical signficiance. Thus, the benchmark results do not appear sensitive to the omission of 
the FDI channel.  
A quasi-formal test of exhaustivness is provided by Wacziarg (2001). This simple test involves 
regressing the residual vector obtained from the system estimates of the growth regression on 
the corruption index. A correlation between the estimated residual and the corruption index 
could indicate that a significant channel has been omitted from the growth equation.
32 The 
results are presented in Table 13. In all the models the null hypothesis that the residual effect is 
not significantly different from zero cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. 
This reinforces our confidence that no major channel has been ommitted and that our 
benchmark model has captured the effect of corruption on economic growth.         
[Table 13] 
5. Conclusion 
This article utilises an econometric methodology that attempts to account for the multi-
dimensional nature of, and the inherent endogeneity in, the corruption-growth relationship. This 
methodology entailed the joint estimation of a system of equations in which the nexus between 
corruption and growth could be explained by the growth-determining transmission channels 
which corruption affects. While many past studies have found only a weak statistical relationship 
between corruption and growth at the macro-level, we find a statistically robust negative total 
effect. The methodology employed in this study allows us to describe what drives this overall 
result. Substantial evidence is found that suggests corruption is detrimental to growth through 
adversely effecting investments in physical capital, human capital levels, and political stability. 
These effects are somewhat dampened by growth-fostering effects through decreasing 
government consumption and increasing trade openness. In the main, these effects are found to 
be robust to changes in specification, sample coverage, and estimation method. The effect 
through the openness channel, however, is found to be weak and not robust across different 31 
 
specifications and sub-samples. Moreover, our results appear supportive of the notion that the 
negative effect of corruption on growth is diminished in economies with low governance levels 
or a high degree of regulation. However, the idea that corruption could be beneficial in 
economies with low quality institutions appears unsupported, with the negative effect of 
corruption on growth via the political instability channel robust in even these economies. These 
results are found to be robust to alternative measures of governance and regulation. Our results 
suggest that, while policies that reduce the level of corruption are necessary, a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach is inappropriate. More specifically, it is important to be context-specific and focus on 
those aspects of corruption that most constrain development (c.f. Rodrik, 2006).  
Overall, the results of this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that corruption is, in the 
main, harmful to economic growth. However, the corruption-growth relationship is not 
straightforward, and efforts to improve governance and reduce unnecessary regulations are 
needed in combination with efforts to reduce corruption levels. And all of this should ideally be 
tailored to the specific nature of the economy under consideration. 
Notes 
1 See Bardhan (1997) and Sveenson (2005) for reviews of existing literature. 
2 Kaufmann (1997) offers a survey of the practical and theoretical shortcomings of “efficient corruption” arguments.     
3 Wade (1982) finds such patterns of behaviour in the context of government funded canals in India. 
4 See Lambsdorff (1999) for a review of earlier studies. 
5 However, a robust relationship between human-capital variable and growth has been difficult to establish in some 
studies (see Bils and Klenow, 2000; Pritchett, 2001).   
6 Admittedly corruption probably has a greater impact on the types of government’s activities undertaken rather 
than the size of government expenditure. For example, Delavallade (2006) shows that corruption distorts the 
structure of public spending by reducing the portion of social expenditure and increasing the part dedicated to 
public services and order, fuel and energy, culture, and defense. Since we lack sufficient data to capture these effects 
we use public consumption as an imperfect proxy.    
7 Southgate et al. (2000) observed that tight controls on the circulation and utilization of Ecuadorian forest products 
opened up multiple opportunities for bribery.  
8 The Solomon Island provides an example of the potential impact corruption can have on political instability. In 
2006, only three weeks after being elected Solomon Islands’ Prime Minister, Snyder Rini resigned as riots in the 
capital, Honiara, caused damage to property and businesses and resulted in the deployment of hundreds of foreign 
troops and police. The prime cause of the riots was allegations against the former prime minister of electoral 
corruption and favouritism. 
9 The econometric theory underlying this model is an extension of the three-stage least squares method developed 
by Zellner and Theil (1962) to the case of panel data.   
10 The notation follows directly from Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), whereby the superscripts indicate equations 
while subscripts indicate variables.  
11 Due to this restriction we can drop the time notation. 




13 Wacziarg (2001) model also includes feedback via the inclusion of growth in the openness equation (see Table C-1 
on page 428 of his paper). Nonetheless, Wacziarg does not include the calculation of this feedback effect in his 
calculation of the total effect of openness on economic growth. Since growth is the only channel in this model the 
feedback is minimal. This could perhaps explain the absence of a total effect calculation.    
14 The total effects presented in all the tables take the first round change in corruption to be 1. 
15 This result is a generalisation of Greene (2003: 392) to the case of panel data.  
16 The standard errors on the products of coefficients are calculated by a linear Taylor series expansion around the 
estimated parameter, and sequentially, calculate the corresponding the standard errors using the formula for the 
variance of linear function of random variables.     
17 We examine the sensitivity of our method to by reporting Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimates. The 
SUR method does not instrument the endogenous variables but does take advantage of possible cross-equation 
error correlations to improve the efficiency of the estimates. 
18 See Gallant and Jorgenson (1979) 
19 See Tables A1, A2, and A3 for a complete description of the data; including descriptions, sources, country 
coverage, and summary statistics.  
20 Note that the use of five-year and six-year periods was purely a consequence of the 22 years.  
21 The index originally varied from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating less corruption. For easy of interpretation in 
the regression results we have reversed the values so that higher values of the index imply higher corruption.  
22 See Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2008) 
23 See Figures A1 to A6 in the appendix for graphs of the relationship between the main variables and corruption.   
24 Table A4 in the appendix presents the whole system estimates for the benchmark theoretical model from which 
the results in Table 3 are taken. 
25 Following Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) we also report a Wald test for the non-linear hypothesis that the sum of 
the individual channels is insignificantly different from zero.  
26 Interestingly, the impact of corruption is found to be roughly similar to the effect of democracy on growth (0.355) 
as estimated by Tavares and Wacziarg (2001: 1359). 
27 This is to be expected as the inclusion of the region dummies is equivalent to disregarding some of the between-
country variation in the determinants of the channels, which may drive much of the partial co-variation between the 
right-hand-side variables and corruption (Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001). 
28 See Table A4 in the appendix.  
29 See Table A1 in the appendix for descriptions and sources of the variables.  
30 The World Bank’s government effectiveness and rule of law measures both lead to the exclusion of the same 
countries and thus are reported together.  
31 See Table A1 for a description of the regulation measures.   
32 As Wacziarg (2001: 421) notes, this test should not be taken as an absolute proof that the model is fully exhausted 
but rather an indication that no major channel has been omitted.  
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Growth in all the channels and all endogenous variables in the corruption equation
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Table 1: Benchmark model specification  







Equation  Number  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Endogenous Variables 
Growth  7
1 γ  
Investment  1
2 γ  
Human Capital  1
3 γ  
Openness  1
4 γ  
2
4 γ  
3
4 γ  
6
4 γ  
7
4 γ  
Political Instability  1
5 γ  
6
5 γ  
7
5 γ  
Government Size  1
6 γ  
2
6 γ  
3
6 γ     5
6 γ     
Corruption   2
7 γ  
3
7 γ  
4
7 γ  
5
7 γ  
6
7 γ    
Exogenous Variables 
Intercept  1
1 δ  
2
1 δ  
3
1 δ  
4
1 δ  
5
1 δ  
6
1 δ  
7
1 δ  
Log initial income  1
2 δ  
2
2 δ  
3
2 δ  
4
2 δ  
5
2 δ  
6
2 δ  
7
2 δ  
Population density  6
3 δ  
Log population  2
4 δ  
3
4 δ  
4
4 δ  
6
4 δ  
7
4 δ  
Age dependency  2
5 δ  
3
5 δ  
6
5 δ  
War count  5
6 δ  
Postwar independence  4
7 δ  
5
7 δ  
6
7 δ  
Former British colony  3
8 δ  
5
8 δ  
6
8 δ  
7
8 δ  
Oil producing nations  4
9 δ  
Etholinguistic frac.  2
10 δ  
3
10 δ  
5
10 δ  
6
10 δ  
Protestant  3
11 δ  
4
11 δ  
7
11 δ  
Eastern Religions  2
12 δ  
3
12 δ  
Democracy index  3
13 δ  
5
13 δ  
Democracy index squared  5
14 δ  
Democratic since 1950  5
15 δ  
7
15 δ  
Press freedom  7
16 δ  
Log inflation  5
17 δ  
Terms of trade shocks  4
18 δ  
6
18 δ  
Log air distance  4
19 δ  
5
19 δ  
7
19 δ  
Log area  4
20 δ  
Landlocked  4
21 δ  
6
20 δ  
7
21 δ  
Island  4
22 δ  
5
22 δ  
6
22 δ  
Notes: See Table A4 for full estimation of this model. Blanks here indicate zero restrictions are imposed in the 




Table 2: Correlation matrix for the main variables (1984-2005 average)  






Corruption     -0.142**  1
Log Initial Income  0.197***  -0.665*** 1
Investment 0.363***  -0.480*** 0.633*** 1
Human Capital  0.232***  -0.654*** 0.844*** 0.637*** 1 
Openness   0.118**     -0.006    0.099*    0.158***   0.119**  1
Political Instability  -0.154***  0.298*** -0.301*** -0.260*** -0.233*** -0.188*** 1
Government Size    -0.020  -0.494*** 0.472*** 0.282*** 0.385***  0.267*** -0.251***
Notes: Number of countries: 81. Variables are described in the relevant text and in Table A1 of the appendix. Asterisks indicate the correlation is 
significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.     
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Table 3: Simultaneous growth-corruption model: Benchmark specification 
Channel Effect  of  corruption 
on the channel
Effect of the channel 
on growth
Effect of corruption 
on growth
Investment  -1.3344 0.1958 -0.2612
(-7.467) (8.193) (-5.662)
Human Capital  -0.1922 0.2241 -0.0431
(-7.067) (2.934) (-2.755)
Openness  8.3686 0.0051 0.0429
(7.162) (1.889) (1.766)
Political Instability  0.1060 -1.1781 -0.1249
(6.123) (-5.552) (-4.317)
Government Size  -1.5304 -0.0633 0.0968
(-8.174) (-2.178) (2.190)
Combined Effect  -0.2894
(-3.515)
Wald test  12.353
(p-value)  (0.0004)
Total Effect  -0.3409
Number of iterations  20
Number of observations        81
Notes: Estimated by 3SLS.  The second column presents the coefficient of corruption on the channel equations, the 
third column presents the coefficients of the channel variables in the growth equation, and the last column presents 
the product effect (that is, the product of the two coefficients). The sum of these products is the combined effect. 
The total effect is calculated using an iteration process with a convergence criterion that the feedback into the 
corruption equation be greater than 1 * 10-15. In parentheses, t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-
robust) standard errors are reported. All variables are described within the text and appendix. The full model is 
reported in Table A4 of the appendix.   
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included in the 
corruption 
equation 
Growth in all 
channels and all 
endogenous 
variables in the 
corruption 
equation
Investment  -0.2612 -0.2528 -0.2655 -0.3093 -0.4507
(-5.66) (-5.55) (-5.71) (-6.20) (-9.46)
Human  Capital  -0.0431 -0.0410 -0.0423 -0.0537 -0.0113
(-2.76) (-2.70) (-2.77) (-2.86) (-0.65)
Openness  0.0429 0.0344 0.0303 0.0581 0.1734
(1.77) (2.07) (1.91) (2.30) (5.65)
Political  Instability -0.1249 -0.0582 -0.0639 -0.1094 -0.1022
(-4.32) (-2.75) (-2.83) (-4.07) (-4.39)
Government  Size  0.0968 0.1036 0.0940 0.1429 0.1337
(2.19) (2.33) (2.15) (2.45) (2.50)
Combined Effect  -0.2894  -0.2140 -0.2474 -0.2713  -0.2571
 (-3.51)  (-2.84) (-3.28) (-2.82)  (-3.01)
Wald  test  12.3527 8.0850 10.7541 7.9245 9.0440
(p-value)  (0.0004) (0.0045) (0.0010) (0.0049) (0.0026)
Total Effect  -0.3409  -0.2140 -0.2482 -0.5945  -0.5219
Number of iterations  20  NA 8 54  53
Number  of  observations  81 81 81 81 81
Notes: Estimated by 3SLS. Each column presents the product effects under the different specifications. The sum of 
these products is the combined effect. The total effect is calculated using an iteration process with a convergence 
criterion that the feedback into the corruption equation be greater than 1 * 10-15. In parentheses, t-statistics based on 
heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables are described within the text 
and appendix. 
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Investment -0.2612  -0.2970 -0.3097 -0.3096  -0.3114
(-5.66) (-4.92) (-5.10) (-5.16)  (-5.28)
Human Capital  -0.0431  -0.0347 -0.0309 -0.0308  -0.0302
(-2.76) (-2.23) (-2.03) (-1.97)  (-2.04)
Openness 0.0429  0.0954 0.0977 0.0977  0.0953
(1.77) (2.44) (2.41) (2.42)  (2.37)
Political Instability  -0.1249 -0.1006 -0.0981 -0.0995  -0.0982
(-4.32) (-3.61) (-3.49) (-3.53)  (-3.51)
Government Size  0.0968  0.1357 0.1267 0.1272  0.1171
(2.19) (2.22) (2.04) (2.05)  (1.88)
Combined Effect  -0.2894  -0.2012 -0.2143 -0.2150  -0.2274
 (-3.51)  (-1.83) (-1.92) (-1.93)  (-2.07)
Wald test  12.3527  3.3671 3.6885 3.7416  4.2694
(p-value) (0.0004)  (0.0665) (0.0548) (0.0531)  (0.0388)
Total Effect  -0.3409  -0.6595 -0.6867 -0.6926  -0.7185
Number of iterations  20  97 94 95  93
Number  of  observations  81  81 81 81 81
QLR Statistic (total)    60.2554 66.8208  75.3842
(p-value)   (0.291) (0.226)  (0.118)
Notes: Estimated by 3SLS. Each column presents the product effects under the different specifications. The sum of 
these products is the combined effect. The total effect is calculated using an iteration process with a convergence 
criterion that the feedback into the corruption equation be greater than 1 * 10-15. In parentheses, t-statistics based on 
heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables are described within the text 
and appendix.  




Table 6: Simultaneous growth-corruption model: Sensitivity to specification 



















Growth in all 
channels
Investment -0.2612 -0.2665 -0.1027 -0.1058  -0.0820 -0.4123 -0.3431
(-5.66) (-5.05) (-2.43) (-2.42) (-2.24) (-6.90) (-7.27)
Human Capital  -0.0431 -0.0439 -0.0363 -0.0394  -0.0447 -0.1053 -0.0079
(-2.76) (-2.08) (-1.80) (-1.93) (-1.97) (-4.08) (-0.54)
Openness 0.0429 0.0113 0.0122 0.0141  0.0039 0.0260 0.1597
(1.77) (1.23) (1.07) (1.12) (0.34) (1.47) (5.30)
Political Instability  -0.1249 -0.1892 -0.1224 -0.1008  -0.1578 -0.1228 -0.1172
(-4.32) (-4.37) (-3.32) (-2.97) (-3.43) (-3.93) (-4.71)
Government Size  0.0968 0.0907 0.0715 0.0656  -0.0026 0.0995 0.0957
(2.19) (1.83) (1.46) (1.36) (-0.05) (1.30) (2.25)
Combined Effect  -0.2894 -0.3975 -0.1777 -0.1663  -0.2832 -0.5149 -0.2127
 (-3.51) (-4.67) (-2.12) (-1.99) (-3.30) (-4.73) (-2.76)
Wald test  12.3527 21.7861 4.4836 3.9585  10.8755 22.3749 7.5902
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0342) (0.0466)  (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0059)
Total Effect  -0.3409 -0.4647 -0.1952 -0.1787  -0.3058 -0.5877 -0.2522
Number of iterations  20 19 16 14  15 18 20
Number  of  observations 81 81 81 81    81 81 81
Notes: Estimated by 3SLS. Each column presents the product effects under the different specifications. The sum of these products is the combined effect. The total effect is 
calculated using an iteration process with a convergence criterion that the feedback into the corruption equation be greater than 1 * 10-15. In parentheses, t-statistics based on 
heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables are described within the text and appendix.  43 
 





SUR estimates COC Measure  
(1996-2005)








COC Measure  
Time and 
geographical 
regions in all 
equations  
(1996-2005)
Investment  -0.2612 -0.1238 -0.4652 -0.0036 -0.0207
(-5.66) (-4.36) (-2.74) (-0.03) (-0.14)
Human  Capital  -0.0431 -0.0154 -0.0795 -0.3081 -0.3784
(-2.76) (-2.04) (-1.00) (-2.11) (-2.43)
Openness 0.0429  0.0163 -0.2013 -0.1223  -0.0937
(1.77) (1.13) (-1.85) (-1.56)  (-1.28)
Political  Instability -0.1249 -0.0387 0.0583 -0.1218 -0.2015
(-4.32) (-2.45) (0.64) (-0.97) (-1.24)
Government Size  0.0968  0.0950 0.1607 0.0495  0.0419
(2.19) (2.73) (1.28) (0.43) (0.29)
Combined Effect  -0.2894  -0.0666 -0.5269 -0.5063  -0.6524
 (-3.51)  (-1.15) (-2.21) (-1.96)  (-2.09)
Wald test  12.3527  1.3120 4.8912 3.8463  4.3613
(p-value)  (0.0004) (0.2520) (0.0270) (0.0499) (0.0368)
Total Effect  -0.3409  -0.0700 -0.5437 -0.5200  -0.6814
Number of iterations  20  13 11 11  12
Number  of  observations  81 81 81 81    81 
Notes: Estimated by 3SLS, unless otherwise stated. Each product presents the combined effects under the different 
specifications. The sum of these products is the combined effect. The total effect is calculated using an iteration 
process with a convergence criterion that the feedback into the corruption equation be greater than 1 * 10-15. In 
parentheses, t -statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All 
variables are described within the text and appendix.  
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Investment -0.2612 0.0065 -0.1487 -0.2439  -0.1360
(-5.66) (0.23) (-4.68) (-5.22) (-3.67)
Human Capital  -0.0431 -0.0090 -0.0121 -0.0648  -0.0230
(-2.76) (-0.76) (-1.14) (-3.31) (-2.70)
Openness 0.0429 -0.00003 -0.0004 0.0240  0.0185
(1.77) (-0.003) (-0.04) (1.28) (0.63)
Political Instability  -0.1249 -0.0586 -0.0360 -0.0386  -0.1152
(-4.32) (-2.62) (-1.92) (-2.14) (-3.36)
Government Size  0.0968 0.0397 0.0493 0.0178  0.1036
(2.19) (1.96) (2.18) (0.48) (2.97)
Combined Effect  -0.2894 -0.0214 -0.1478 -0.3056  -0.1522
 (-3.51) (-0.45) (-3.03) (-4.17)  (-1.74)
Wald test  12.3527 0.2050 9.1725 17.4056  3.0436
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.6508) (0.0025) (0.0000)  (0.0811)
Total Effect  -0.3409 -0.0223 -0.1555 -0.3293  -0.1866
Number of iterations  20 12 13 15  22
Number of observations  81 59 59 63  76
Notes: Estimated by 3SLS. Each product presents the combined effects under the different specifications. The sum 
of these products is the combined effect. The total effect is calculated using an iteration process with a convergence 
criterion that the feedback into the corruption equation be greater than 1 * 10-15. In parentheses, t-statistics based on 
heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables are described within the text 
and appendix.  




Table 9: Simultaneous growth-corruption model: Sensitivity to governance levels 
Channel  Base model DA Measure LO Measure COCG & COCL 
Measures
COCP Measure COCV Measure
Investment -0.2612 -0.0365 -0.0376 -0.0665 -0.0603 -0.0390
(-5.66) (-1.16) (-1.19) (-2.18) (-2.01) (-1.42)
Human Capital  -0.0431 -0.0071 0.0011 -0.0071 -0.0344 -0.0361
(-2.76) (-0.52) (0.09) (-0.61) (-2.85) (-2.57)
Openness 0.0429 0.0012 -0.0071 0.0010 0.0082 0.0066
(1.77) (0.38) (-0.64) (0.39) (0.45) (0.58)
Political Instability  -0.1249 -0.1135 -0.0905 -0.0789 -0.0882 -0.0860
(-4.32) (-3.43) (-3.16) (-2.92) (-3.14) (-3.10)
Government Size  0.0968 0.0452 0.0400 0.0405 0.1030 0.0418
(2.19) (1.74) (1.93) (1.76) (3.34) (1.77)
Combined Effect  -0.2894 -0.1106 -0.0941 -0.1110 -0.0716 -0.1127
 (-3.51) (-1.92) (-1.75) (-2.23) (-1.17) (-2.07)
Wald test  12.3527 3.6692 3.0616 4.9507 1.3631 4.2810
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0554) (0.0802) (0.0261) (0.2430) (0.0385)
Total Effect  -0.3409 -0.1179 -0.1013 -0.1173 -0.0791 -0.1203
Number of iterations  20 14 15 13 16 14
Number  of  observations  81 61 61 61 61 61 
Notes: Estimated by 3SLS. Countries rated in top quartile are excluded. Each column presents the product effects under the different specifications. The sum of these products 
is the combined effect. The total effect is calculated using an iteration process with a convergence criterion that the feedback into the corruption equation be greater than 1 * 
10-15. In parentheses, t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables are described within the text and appendix.  46 
 
Table 10: Simultaneous growth-corruption model: Sensitivity to regulation levels 




Investment -0.2612 -0.0455 -0.0810 -0.1306  -0.0304
(-5.66) (-1.61) (-2.42) (-3.67) (-1.12)
Human Capital  -0.0431 -0.0422 0.0145 0.0067  -0.0077
(-2.76) (-3.06) (1.80) (0.85) (-0.73)
Openness 0.0429 0.0067 0.0033 -0.0466  0.0061
(1.77) (0.38) (0.63) (-2.29) (0.58)
Political Instability  -0.1249 -0.0810 -0.0934 -0.0497 -0.0901
(-4.32) (-3.02) (-2.99) (-2.83) (-3.40)
Government Size  0.0968 0.0845 0.0498 0.1251  0.0451
(2.19) (3.25) (1.78) (6.60) (1.79)
Combined Effect  -0.2894 -0.0775 -0.1068 -0.0951  -0.0771
 (-3.51) (-1.45) (-1.85) (-1.72) (-1.53)
Wald test  12.3527 2.0937 3.4267 2.9682  2.3523
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.1479) (0.0642) (0.0849)  (0.1251)
Total Effect  -0.3409 -0.0852 -0.1127 -0.1042  -0.0824
Number of iterations  20 16 13 16  14
Number  of  observations 81 61 61 61    61 
Notes: Estimated by 3SLS. Countries rated in top quartile are excluded. Each column presents the product effects 
under the different specifications. The sum of these products is the combined effect. The total effect is calculated 
using an iteration process with a convergence criterion that the feedback into the corruption equation be greater 
than 1 * 10-15. In parentheses, t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are 











Table 11: Simultaneous growth-corruption model: Sensitivity to extension, FDI channel 
 Channel  Base model Base model with 
FDI channel
Base model with 
FDI channel 
Full
Base model with 
FDI channel 
iteration #1 
Base model with 
FDI channel 
iteration #2
Base model with 
FDI channel 
iteration #3
Base model with 
FDI channel 
iteration #4
Investment -0.2612 -0.2685 -0.2822 -0.2975  -0.2921 -0.3066 -0.3082
(-5.66) (-6.20) (-4.84) (-5.45) (-5.36) (-5.51) (-5.55)
Human Capital  -0.0431 -0.0396 -0.0411 -0.0409  -0.0418 -0.0412 -0.0422
(-2.76) (-2.79) (-2.38) (-2.33) (-2.35) (-2.26) (-2.29)
Openness 0.0429 0.0217 0.0370 0.0163  0.0173 0.0201 0.0203
(1.77) (0.94) (1.29) (0.65) (0.70) (0.82) (0.82)
Political Instability  -0.1249 -0.1229 -0.1171 -0.1203  -0.1199 -0.1200 -0.1212
(-4.32) (-4.56) (-4.10) (-4.40) (-4.28) (-4.23) (-4.29)
Government Size  0.0968 0.0897 0.1670 0.1701  0.1728 0.1813 0.1838
(2.19) (2.30) (2.50) (2.64) (2.70) (2.86) (2.95)
FDI  0.0284 0.0421 0.0407 0.0385 0.0349 0.0317
(1.08) (0.74) (0.78) (0.72) (0.65) (0.59)
Combined Effect  -0.2894 -0.2911 -0.1944 -0.2316  -0.2251 -0.2316 -0.2359
 (-3.51) (-3.85) (-1.73) (-2.15) (-2.09) (-2.13) (-2.19)
Wald test  12.3527 14.8500 2.9878 4.6069  4.3737 4.5386 4.7770
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0839) (0.0318)  (0.0365) (0.0331) (0.0288)
Total Effect  -0.3409 -0.3381 -0.6541 -0.7100  -0.6996 -0.6972 -0.7154
Number of iterations  20 19 100 89  91 87 88
Number  of  observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
Notes: Estimated by 3SLS. Each column presents the product effects under the different specifications. The sum of these products is the combined effect. The total effect is 
calculated using an iteration process with a convergence criterion that the feedback into the corruption equation be greater than 1 * 10-15. In parentheses, t-statistics based on 

































Investment -0.2612  -0.2685 -0.2590 -0.1089 -0.1133 -0.0811 -0.3261 -0.1253
(-5.66) (-6.20) (-5.22) (-2.67) (-2.70) (-2.43) (-6.81) (-4.88)
Human Capital  -0.0431  -0.0396 -0.0376 -0.0285 -0.0345 -0.0348 -0.0489 -0.0140
(-2.76) (-2.79) (-1.98) (-1.53) (-1.81) (-1.66) (-2.93) (-2.08)
Openness 0.0429  0.0217 0.0076 0.0099 0.0117 -0.0055 0.0416 -0.0014
(1.77) (0.94) (0.93) (0.83) (0.88) (-0.49) (1.73) (-0.10)
Political Instability  -0.1249  -0.1229 -0.1913 -0.1070 -0.0881 -0.1358 -0.1110 -0.0377
(-4.32) (-4.56) (-4.92) (-3.47) (-3.04) (-3.52) (-4.24) (-2.55)
Government Size  0.0968  0.0897 0.0849 0.0869 0.0799 0.0315 0.1475 0.0840
(2.19) (2.30) (2.01) (1.98) (1.83) (0.68) (2.83) (2.63)
FDI    0.0284 0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0033 -0.0153 0.0155 0.0370
    (1.08) (0.37) (-0.44) (-0.50) (-0.97) (0.62) (1.72)
Combined Effect  -0.2894  -0.2911 -0.3933 -0.1501 -0.1476 -0.2410 -0.2815 -0.0574
 (-3.51)  (-3.85) (-5.07) (-1.97) (-1.91) (-3.07) (-3.12) (-1.02)
Wald test  12.3527  14.8500 25.6603 3.8738 3.6469 9.4361 9.7414 1.0372
(p-value) (0.0004)  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0490) (0.0562) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.3085)
Total Effect  -0.3409  -0.3381 -0.4571 -0.1638 -0.1575 -0.2582 -0.5491 -0.0602
Number of iterations  20  19 19 15 14 14 50 13
Number  of  observations  81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
Notes: Estimated by 3SLS, unless otherwise stated. Each column presents the product effects under the different specifications. The sum of these products is the combined effect. 
The total effect is calculated using an iteration process with a convergence criterion that the feedback into the corruption equation be greater than 1 * 10-15. In parentheses, t-




Table 13: Testing Exhaustiveness, regressing residuals from the growth regression on corruption 
  










Intercept -0.169 0.157 0.881 0.170  0.049 -0.112 0.092
(-0.51) (0.49) (1.30) (0.24) (0.14) (-0.43) (0.29)
Corruption -0.035 -0.071 -0.075 -0.177  -0.032 0.038 -0.117
(-0.26) (-0.56) (-0.45) (-0.79) (-0.20) (0.35) (-0.94)
R2  0.037  0.003 0.047 0.001 0.034 0.091 0.019 0.017 0.042 0.0001  0.073 0.037 0.058 0.001 
0.031  0.046 0.051 0.037 0.028 0.073 0.049 0.001 0.065 0.044 0.041 0.080 0.051 0.020 
Number of observations  81 81 81 59  59 63 76
Notes: Estimated by SUR. In parentheses, t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables are described within the text and 
appendix.  
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Appendix  
Figure A1: Growth and Corruption, 1984-2005 
 
Figure A2: Investment and Corruption, 1984-2005 
 
Figure A3: Human Capital and Corruption, 1984-2005 
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Figure A4: Openness and Corruption, 1984-2005 
 
Figure A5: Political Instability and Corruption, 1984-2005 
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Table A1: Data definitions of variables 
Variable Description 
Growth  Growth rate of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted Real Gross Domestic Product per 
capita. Units: percent points. Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006) and WDI (2008) 
Corruption  Index (0-6) of corruption. Based on the analysis of worldwide network of experts. Units: 0 = 
Low Corruption and 6 = High Corruption. Source: ICRG (2006) 
Control of 
corruption 
Measures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests. Units: High numbers signify greater corruption. Source: Kaufmann 
et al. (2008) 
Initial income  Gross Domestic Product per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP), Chain Index. 
Measured at the beginning of each period, with missing values calculated from WDI growth 
rates. Units: natural log of per capita GDP (in 000's) in 2000 international dollars. Source: 
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006) and WDI (2008) 
Investment  Rate of physical capital investment in constant prices, with missing values calculated using 
WDI growth rates of Gross Capital Formation. Units: percentage of GDP. Source: Heston, 
Summers, and Aten (2006) and WDI (2008) 
Human Capital  Average schooling years in the population over age 25. Units: Years. Source: Barro and Lee 
(2000) 
Openness  Sum of exports and imports of goods and services, with missing values calculated using 
WDI growth rates of sum of exports and imports of goods and services. Units: percentage 
of GDP. Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006) and WDI (2008) 
Political Instability  The number of coups d’état and revolutions per year. Coups are measured as the number of 
extra constitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and/or its effective 
control of the nation's power structure in a given year.  Unsuccessful coups are not counted. 
The number of revolutions per year is defined as any illegal or forced change in the top 
governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed 
rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government. Units: scalar. Source: 
Banks (2006) 
Government  Size  General government final consumption expenditure includes all government current 




Net inflows of foreign investment. Units: percentage of GDP. Source: WDI (2008) 
Population density Population  density.  Units: people per square kilometer. Source: WDI (2008) 
Population  Includes all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship - except for refugees not 
permanently settled in the country of asylum - who are generally considered part of the 
population of their country of origin. Units: natural log of figures scaled in 1,000,000s. Source: 
WDI (2008) 
Age dependency  Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents – people younger than 15 or older than 64 
– to the working-age population – those ages 15-64. Units: scalar, e.g. 0.7 means there are 7 
dependents for every 10 working-age people. Source: WDI (2008) 
War count  Number of armed conflicts, external and internal, in which the government was involved as 




Takes a value of 1 if country gained independence after World War II, 0 otherwise. Units: 
dummy variable. Source: Gerring et al. (2005)  
Former British 
colony 
Takes a value of 1 if a former British colony since 1776, 0 otherwise. Units: dummy variable. 
Source: Barro (1999) 
Oil producing 
nations 




Probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the 
same ethnolingustic group. Units: probability. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
Protestant  Identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to a Protestant 
denomination in 2000. Units: Percent points. Source: Barro and McCleary (2002) 
Eastern Religions  Identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to an Eastern 
Religion not including Hinduism in 2000. Units: Percent points. Source: Barro and McCleary 
(2002) 
Democracy Index  Equally weighted index (1-7) of civil liberties and political rights. Units: 1 = Low Level 7 =   53 
 
High Level. Source: Freedom House (2008) 
Democratic since 
1950 
Takes a value of 1 if country has experienced uninterrupted democracy for 55 years as 
classified by Beck et al. (2001), 0 otherwise. Units: dummy variable. Source: Treisman (2007) 
Press freedom  Index (0-100) of free press. Units: 0 = Low degree 100 = High degree. Source: Freedom 
House (2008) 
Inflation  Percentage change in the cost of the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods 
and services, measured by GDP implicit deflator. Units: natural log of inflation plus 100. 
Source: WDI (2008) 
Terms of trade 
shocks 
Growth rate of export price index multiplied by share of exports in GDP, less the growth 
rate of import price index multiplied by share of imports in GDP. Units: Percent points. 
Source: WDI (2008) 
Air  distance  The minimum distance to one of the three capital-goods-supplying regions: the U.S., 
Western Europe, and Japan, specifically measured as distance from the country’s capital city 
to New York, Rotterdam, or Tokyo. Units: natural log of the Great-Circle (air) distance in 
kilometers. Source: Sachs and Warner (1995) 
Area   Land Area: Units: natural log of km2. Source: Sachs and Warner (1995) 
Landlocked  Takes a value of 1 if country is landlocked, 0 otherwise. Units: dummy variable. Source: GDN 
(2008) 
Island  Takes the value of 1 if the country is a geographical island, 0 otherwise. Units: dummy 




Index (0-6) of how responsive government is to its people. Units: 0 = Mildly Responsive 6 = 
Highly Responsive (DA Measure). Source: ICRG (2006) 
Law and Order  Index (0-6) of level of law and order based on strength and impartiality of judicial system 
and crime rates. Units: 0 = Low level 6 = High level (LO Measure). Source: ICRG (2006) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Measures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.   
(COCG Measure). Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
Rule of Law  Measures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. (COCL Measure). 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
Absence of 
Violence 
Measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence 
and terrorism. (COCP Measure). Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Measures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 




Index (0-6) of institutional strength and quality of bureaucracy. Units: 0 = Low Quality 4 = 
High Quality (BQ Measure). Source: ICRG (2006)  
Investment Profile  Index (0-12) of risk of investment, subcomponents include: contract viability/expropriation, 
profit repatriation and payment delays. Units: 0 = Low Risk and 12 = High Risk (IP 
Measure). Source: ICRG (2006) 
EFW  Regulation  Index (1-10) of the degree of economic freedom in terms of regulation in the business, 
credit and labour markets. Units 1 = high freedom 10 = low freedom (EFW Reg Measure). 
Source: Gwartney, Lawson and Norton (2008) 
Regulatory Quality  Measures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Units: high 
numbers signify greater regulatory barriers (COC Reg Measure). Source: Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
   54 
 
Table A2: Country coverage  
 OECD  Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Middle East and Africa  Asia 
Australia 1 2 3 4 5 b c d   Argentina  Algeria  Bangladesh 
Austria 1 2 3 4 5 a b d Bolivia  Bahrain  2 c  China 
Belgium 1 2 3 4 5 a b d Brazil  Botswana 4 a c   India 
Canada 1 2 3 4 5 a b c d Chile  3 4 c d Bulgaria  Indonesia 
Denmark 1 2 3 4 5 a b c d Colombia  Cameroon  Malaysia c 
Finland 1 2 3 4 5 a b c d Costa  Rica  4 5  Congo  Pakistan 
France 1 2 3 4 5 a b d Dominican  Republic  Congo, DR  Philippines 
Greece Ecuador  Egypt  Sri  Lanka 
Hungary 1 2 4 5 b d Guatemala  Gambia  Thailand 
Ireland 1 2 3 4 5 a b c d Guyana  Ghana 
Italy 2 5 a  Honduras  Iran 
Japan 1 2 3 4 a b c  Haiti  Israel  1 3 b d 
Netherlands 1 2 3 4 5 a b c d Jamaica  Jordan 
New Zealand 1 2 3 4 5 a b c d    Mexico  Kenya 
Norway 1 2 3 4 5 a b c d Nicaragua  Kuwait  c 
Portugal 1 2 3 4 5 a d  Panama  Malawi 
South Korea a  Peru  Mali 
Spain 1 3 5 a b d Paraguay  Mozambique 
Sweden 1 2 3 4 5 a b c d El  Salvador  Senegal 
Switzerland 1 2 3 4 5 a b c d  Trinidad & Tobago c  Sierra Leone 
United Kingdom 1 2 3 4 5 a b c d  Uruguay  South Africa b c  






      Zimbabwe    
Notes: Countries in bold are sub-Saharan African countries. Countries in italics are East Asian countries. 
1 High Governance countries excluded using the DA Measure 
2 High Governance countries excluded using the LO Measure 
3 High Governance countries excluded using the COCG and COCL Measures 
4 High Governance countries excluded using the COCP Measure 
5 High Governance countries excluded using the COCV Measure 
a Low Regulation countries excluded using the IP Measure 
b High Bureaucratic quality countries excluded using the BQ Measure 
c Low Regulation countries excluded using the EFW Reg Measure 
d Low Regulation countries excluded using the COC Reg Measure 
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Table A3: Summary statistics (1984-2005 averages) 
   Mean Median Std. Dev Minimum  Maximum
Growth 1.542 1.610 2.760 -8.953  11.589
Corruption 2.722 3.000 1.382 0.000  6.000
Control of corruption  -0.164 0.270 1.101 -2.416  1.907
Log initial income  1.671 1.702 1.087 -1.024  3.537
Investment 15.256 13.659 7.692 2.666  39.998
Human Capital  5.691 5.334 2.832 0.489  12.247
Openness 66.974 57.092 42.405 9.890  264.335
Political Instability  0.218 0.000 0.420 0.000  2.500
Government Size  15.263 14.120 5.903 4.055  46.357
Foreign Direct Investment  2.145 1.360 2.727 -5.653  27.384
Population density  116.145 58.900 160.519 2.086  1124.292
Population 2.640 2.377 1.469 -0.846  7.158
Age dependency  0.689 0.664 0.185 0.358  1.108
War count  0.370 0.000 0.776 0  6.833
Postwar independence  0.420 0.000 0.494 0  1
Former British colony  0.358 0.000 0.480 0  1
Oil producing nations  0.074 0.000 0.262 0  1
Ethnolinguistic Frac.  0.437 0.484 0.265 0.002  0.930
Protestant 13.614 4.900 19.807 0  89.700
Eastern Religions  4.878 0.300 16.276 0  86.800
Democracy Index  4.742 5.000 1.855 1  7
Democratic since 1950  0.207 0.000 0.387 0  1
Press freedom  58.246 61.333 23.993 6.667  93.667
Inflation 4.780 4.679 0.355 4.531  7.200
Terms of trade shocks  0.067 -0.248 5.821 -14.149  83.542
Air distance  7.968 8.189 1.026 4.942  9.136
Area   12.451 12.531 1.795 6.500  16.048
Landlocked 0.148 0.000 0.356 0  1
Island 0.148 0.000 0.356 0  1
Notes: Number of countries: 81 
 




Table A4: System estimates for the benchmark specification 





Intercept 0.1656 8.3720 3.1911 159.6340 -0.4782 6.5137 1.6271
(0.337) (3.143) (5.638) (6.409) (-1.982) (2.244) (2.448)
Log initial income  -0.9934 2.5785 1.5270 4.9200 -0.0673 3.1662 -0.3823
(-4.353) (4.921) (13.452) (1.570) (-2.150) (5.761) (-5.845)
Corruption -1.3344 -0.1922 8.3686 0.1060 -1.5304





Human Capital  0.2241
(2.934)
Openness 0.0051 0.0494 0.0040 0.0160 0.0087
(1.889) (9.538) (3.990) (2.625) (9.837)
Political Instability  -1.1781 1.9336 0.6743
(-5.552) (6.843) (10.655)
Government Size  -0.0633 0.0168 -0.0475 0.0065
(-2.178) (0.442) (-10.746) (2.169)
Population density  -0.0024
(-1.342)
Log population  1.8602 0.2370 -11.1866 -0.5283 0.1458
(6.924) (2.868) (-6.211) (-2.301) (3.675)
Age dependency  -1.4274 -1.7008 10.6843
(-0.600) (-4.124) (4.102)
War count  0.1308
(4.012)
Postwar independence  20.6536 -0.0551 2.2017
(3.931) (-0.853) (2.415)
Former British colony  0.8796 -0.0920 2.0170 -0.0571




Oil producing nations  14.1142
(2.319)
Etholinguistic fractionalization  -4.5242 -0.2183 0.0046 -1.8867
(-2.931) (-0.460) (0.053) (-1.188)
Protestant 0.0251 -0.0395 -0.0163
(4.283) (-0.480) (-7.807)
Eastern Religions  0.0913 0.0129
(3.520) (2.394)
Democracy index  0.1428 0.1692
(5.079) (3.169)
Democracy index squared  -0.0250
(-3.800)
Democratic since 1950  0.3174 -0.1824
(3.823) (-1.481)
Press freedom  -0.0057
(-3.256)
Log inflation  0.1071
(4.601)
Terms of trade shocks  -0.1007 0.2284
(-1.561) (9.520)
Log air distance  -9.6492 -0.0431 0.1637
(-3.249) (-1.898) (2.414)
Log area  -2.6226
(-2.025)
Landlocked  -1.6930 -0.3498 0.3513
(-0.293) (-0.346) (2.297)
Island  -0.3014 0.2448 -2.1798
(-0.068) (3.081) (-2.723)
R2  0.211 0.171 0.524 0.564 0.774 0.796 0.434  0.387 0.273 0.358 0.488 0.623 0.579 0.601 
0.185 0.020 0.640 0.606 0.794 0.789 0.311  0.310 0.330 0.217 0.460 0.482 0.607 0.611 
Notes: Number of countries: 81. In parentheses, t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables are described within the text 
and appendix. R2 is reported for the each of the four time period per equation.  
 